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Executive Summary  
 
Shipping accidents, many involving spills of mineral oil, have been a catalyst for 
environmental protection regulation over the past 40 years. Environmental risk is 
linked to the type and amount of oil and/or hazardous substances being carried 
and the sensitivity of the marine area where any accident happens. A clear link 
can be made between environmental protection and shipping safety, with shipping 
accidents, often the subject of dramatic media coverage, provoking a strong 
response from civil society and politicians. 
 
2012 has been a significant year for shipping safety issues. The IMO used 
Maritime Day (2012) to mark the 100 year anniversary of the sinking of the Titanic 
and as a watershed of safety at sea. Recent shipping incidents such as the Hebei 
Spirit and MV. Rena, and the 10th year anniversary of the sinking of the Prestige 
(2002) further highlight the need to identify and understand the factors contributing 
to shipping accidents. These incidences among others renew the spotlight on the 
main causes of shipping accidents, including the role played by flag States. 
Despite the continual increase in the world’s shipping fleet a decrease in overall 
numbers of shipping accidents has been seen over the last few decades. Whilst 
the data shows that poorly performing flag States are still an associated factor, 
there are other criteria that also strongly contribute to accidents, including: vessel 
age, vessel type, area of operation and challenging sea states (linked to the most 
common incident type – foundering) and vessel size. Behind these criteria there 
are layers of administrative complexities within the shipping industry which are 
connected to port and flag State control, flag registration and ratification of IMO 
conventions. Economic factors also have an impact on shipping safety, such as 
turn-around times and use of the minimum number of crew required to handle a 
vessel which often has implications such as staff working whilst fatigued.  
 
The key criteria contributing to shipping accidents have been researched for this 
report through an extensive review of the world’s casualty statistics over the past 
15 years and a review of all the port State Control Agreements and Memorandums 
of Understanding. More specific examples were drawn from a review of current 
literature to provide context and the wider picture. The research statistics were 
then verified through interviews with six expert industry stakeholders including a 
major European shipping insurer, the MAIB, the IMO, Lloyds Register, a Naval 
Architect and an English P and I club from the International Group. These criteria, 
and complexities associated with shipping accidents and the industry generally 
were also examined, including insurance and underwriting requirements, the role 
of IACS, port State control and class societies.  
 
This is one of the first independent studies to look in detail at the collective data 
associated with shipping accidents. The report produces consolidated evidence of 
factors that have contributed to shipping accidents over the last 15 years. This 
time period includes maritime disasters such as the Prestige and Erika incidents, 
which subsequently provoked changes in maritime safety regulations, which are 
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graphically summarised in the report as a timeline. The report highlights areas of 
concern and contributory factors to shipping accidents as well as the general 
implications these incidents have on the marine environment. The report focuses 
in particular on the issues surrounding the role of flag States and the extent of 
their responsibilities with respect to vessel safety and the implementation of 
international regulations.  
 
The evidence confirms that the majority of accidents can be linked with older 
vessels, a predominance of general cargo carrier accidents and a suite of worst 
performing flags. By far the most common accident is that the ship founders. 
However it is also encouraging that an outcome of this report is also confirmation 
of an overall improvement in vessel safety standards and a reduction of shipping 
accidents relative to the growth of the world fleet. This reflects the development of 
technology (e.g. electronic charts), the success of enforcement regimes (e.g. Port 
State control), and cooperative prevention efforts such as HELCOM Response 
(HELCOM, nd.) and the Bonn Agreement (Bonn Agreement, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless accidents still occur regularly and the need to address and re-assess 
the related underlying issues remains if future incidents are going to be avoided or 
reduced. Even small scale accidents in very sensitive environments can have 
profound environmental consequences (e.g. MV. Pallas). Climate change 
predictions are likely to exacerbate the causes of foundering: storm surge, 
changing wind/wave climates, extreme weather events. Furthermore there is a 
danger of complacency in the absence of a recent ‘major’ accident and whilst 
much can be inferred from the accident statistics, such data can belie all manner 
of near misses.  
 
In light of the issues highlighted in the report, several recommendations are made. 
These include support for a more cohesive approach towards shipping safety 
through encouragement of ratification of IMO and environmental conventions; 
balancing port and flag State responsibilities; globalised, standardization of 
reporting mechanisms associated with the collection of shipping accident data; 
transparency and access to this information; encouragement of data sharing and 
of best practice concerned with safety procedures within the industry; research 
and collaborative work to keep older sea going vessels classed with IACS class 
societies. These recommendations are particularly pertinent in light of the 
continued growth of the worlds’ shipping fleet, as the economic crisis influences 
the number of ageing ships transporting high risk products and with the likely 
growth of vessels trading and operating in the sensitive Arctic region.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Maritime safety is increasingly significant in a growing, global industry where major 
accidents have wide reaching impacts. Whilst large shipping accidents do still 
occur on the scale of the Prestige and the Erika, they are fortunately quite rare. 
The overall industry picture is one of continual improvement with Lloyds List 
Casualty Survey noting an 18% decrease in the number of accidents and the 
International Union of Marine Insurers recording a continuing downward trend both 
in tonnage and the percentage of the world fleet lost since 1980 (over the past 30 
years). However it is important to keep the pressure focused on this trend for 
improvement and clearly understand the factors which are most significant in 
contributing to losses of lives at sea. Despite the noted improvements, shipping 
accidents still occur globally on a regular basis and can often be linked to a certain 
set of criteria such as certain geographical locations (highlighted by the ‘Incidents 
Map’ – Figure 3). Whilst general improvements are apparent, a minority of flag 
States and port States are still operating outside of the legislative requirements 
resulting in sub-standard shipping slipping through the net and compromising  
human life and the marine environment.  
 
The steady growth in seaborne trade has meant an increase in global shipping 
movements and tonnage. Vessel size has increased the need to benefit from 
economies of scale, whilst manning levels on ships has tended to be reduced with 
the introduction of labour saving and assistive technologies on board. At the same 
time mariners are under pressure to meet deadlines imposed by shipping 
companies and to comply with a raft of legislation pertaining to safety, security and 
the protection of the marine environment. The associated administrative burden is 
expected to be delivered without any additional manning on board the vessels to 
account for the additional hours required to complete the tasks in order to comply 
with company and industry regulations. All these factors impose additional 
stresses and can impact on the safe passage of a vessel (Butt, 2012).  
 
Organisations such as the Marine Accident Investigation Bureau (MAIB) UK and 
the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) Europe and others, work to identify 
the causes of these accidents and to share information with the industry so that 
they can learn from the experiences and recommendations made as a result. Data 
quality and quantity associated with reporting shipping accidents and detentions is 
the responsibility of the many organisations and flag States involved, and the 
member State in whose territorial waters the accident/ detention occurred. This 
becomes more of an issue when several organisations or member States are 
involved who may not be collecting the same data or using the same criteria or 
methods for recording the information.  
 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) provides support to member and 
States to encourage them to ratify their Conventions, although more needs to be 
done in this area. The IMO process is demonstrably effective, but notably slow, 
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which has a bearing on safety response legislation following major accidents, as 
seen by the time line (Figure 1).  
 
Flag State performance continues to play an important role in the quality and 
safety of sea-going vessels around the world. Several organisations publish 
guidelines on flag State performance. These include bodies such as the 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the Maritime International Secretariat 
Services (MARISEC) and the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). 
These guidelines provide indicators to enable performance measurements in a 
number of key areas for example the enforcement of the international maritime 
treaties, maritime security, seafarers’ welfare and movement of ships between 
flags (MARISEC, 2006). Yearly performance tables are produced using these 
indicators to raise awareness of the best and worst performing flag States. The 
following two sections describe the role of flag States addressing the terminology 
and definitions surrounding open registries. What becomes clear is the complexity 
of the subject matter and the lack of common reference points. 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the report 
 
This report was initiated by WWF out of concern for shipping safety at sea and the 
number of shipping accidents impacting on human life, the environment and the 
reputation of the industry. The analysis of key shipping accident data over the past 
15 years was designed to highlight issues associated with those incidences, and 
other underlying factors, to flag State performance, and to demonstrate where 
improvements can be made. To help drive change and further improvements 
within the industry and put pressure in the areas that could make a difference. 
 
 
1.2 Data sources  
 
Various data sources have been consulted and cross-referenced to provide the 
evidence required for this report with a focus on the past 15 years, 1997 - 2012. 
Current data trends have been derived from the Institute of Shipping economics 
and Logistics (ISL), Fairplay and the MOU data bases. The information regarding 
shipping incidents has been drawn from several sources including key reports 
such as the ‘Shipping Industry Flag State performance tables’, the ‘Shipping 
Statistics Year books’ and the ‘Annual Review of Maritime Transport’ among 
others. Additionally, expert interviews were conducted with six key organisations 
associated with shipping safety and accident response (See section 2.2). The 
interviews provided first hand professional evidence from the industry that support 
the data findings. 
 
An issue of data reporting inconsistency became apparent during the research 
with different criteria used to record data from MOUs and from the Shipping 
Statistic Year Books. This issue is expanded upon in sections 3.8 and 4.1. 
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Additionally the data used for the report is only as good as the data mechanisms 
used to collect and report shipping accidents. Although there are continuous 
strides made towards ensuring data consistency and quality, particularly driven by 
the IMO, this area still has great room for improvement throughout the industry. 
 
 
1.2.1 MOUs 
 
The lists of vessel detentions were derived from the eight International 
Memorandums of Understanding, as listed in Table 2: Port State Control Regimes. 
Data provided by the MOUs varies considerably, including the number of years 
data has been collected for and the requirements for reporting. For example the 
Paris MOU was the first to be established in 1978 (Paris MOU, 2010). Therefore 
records of detentions have been kept longer in the regions this MOU covers. 
However, initially only the flags, the number of inspections with deficiencies, ship 
type, and number of deficiencies were recorded. It was not until 2009 that many 
additional headings were required (see Table 4). The increase in detailed 
reporting across the MOUs in more recent years indicates tighter regulations and 
reporting requirements and the need to improve general ship performance on 
many levels. The information concerning the datasets held for the MOUs have 
been found on their relevant websites and databases held there. Whilst work is 
taking place to document data more consistently across the MOUs, this remains a 
major task and one that IMO continually supports. Information from the MOUs is 
presented in section 3.8. 
 
 
1.2.2 Interviews  
 
In order to determine an entirely current picture of the state of play in this field, six 
semi-structured interviews with experts working in associated shipping safety, and 
accident response organisations were undertaken. The interviewees remain 
anonymous and the views expressed were their personal opinions based on 
extensive experience gained within their organisations and the shipping industry 
generally. They included the following: 
 
 The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) 
 Lloyds Register 
 A major European shipping insurer 
 A naval architect 
 A P and I Club, international group 
 The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
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1.3 Flag States 
 
Whilst the ship owner is ultimately responsible for the safety of his/her ship it is the 
flag State that sets the standard. Safety standards are not determined at an 
international level, but minimum safety standards are. Some flag States choose to 
adopt only the very minimum number of international conventions and it is these 
States that are attractive to those ship owners whose main concern is to cut costs 
and who care little for the safety of the seafarers employed on their vessels, the 
impact their operations have on the marine environment and the poor reputation 
they bring to an industry that has made great strides in cleaning up its act. They 
have been labeled ‘flags of convenience’, a derogatory term that is sometimes 
mis-used to refer to all open registries. Labeling all open registers as flags of 
convenience leads to confusion and fails to get to the heart of the matter. It is only 
through identification of those flag States who, it can be demonstrated, have failed 
to fulfill their international obligations, that change can take place by actively 
encouraging them to improve their standards. It is not possible to prevent a flag 
State from operating a shipping registry, but it is possible to shine a spot light on 
those who fail to engage in ensuring that ships that take their nationality, operate 
in a safe way. 
 
 
1.3.1 What is a Flag of Convenience?  
 
The terms ‘open register’ and ‘flag of convenience’ are often used 
interchangeably, causing confusion, however they are not the same thing. The ITF 
defined a flag of convenience (FOC) as, ‘Where beneficial ownership and control 
of a vessel is found to lie elsewhere than in the country of the flag the vessel is 
flying, the vessel is considered as sailing under a flag of convenience’ (ITF, 1974). 
Shipping registers can be either, national registers, second registers or registers. 
National registers, sometimes called ‘closed’ or ‘traditional’ registers, are operated 
by flag States for use by their nations ships only. Open registers are open to 
foreign-owned vessels. Second registers, or ‘international’ registers as they are 
often called, were created by traditional shipping nations as a response to the 
significant losses their national registers suffered as ships were moved out to open 
registers. Second registers offer more operational freedom and exemption from 
some taxes. Countries such as Denmark, Norway, France and the UK operate two 
registers, one National and one International. Flag of convenience is a derogatory 
label, used by the ITF, given to those flag States against whom the allegation that 
they care little for safe shipping standards or seafarer welfare is frequently made. 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) does not refer to flags of 
Convenience nor do they use the terms white, black or grey lists which are used 
by port State MOUs. The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) has 
maintained a running campaign against those registers that they categorise as a 
FOC. It should be noted that it is often the ITF’s definition or classification that is 
used when identifying a particular flag State (See Table 1). 
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Port State control categorise flag States according to lists. Flag States are entered 
each year on a ‘white list’, ‘black list’ or even a ‘grey list’ This denotes their status, 
based on inspection data held by those MOUs and is used as a tool to decide 
which vessels to inspect. The following countries (Table 1) have been assigned 
the ‘Flag of Convenience’ status by the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF) Fair Practice’s Committee. 
  
Table 1: Current Flag of Convenience registries, 2011 (ITF). 
Antigua and Barbuda Gibraltar (UK) 
Bahamas Honduras 
Barbados Jamaica 
Belize Lebanon 
Bermuda (UK) Liberia 
Bolivia Malta 
Burma Marshall Islands (USA) 
Cambodia Mauritius 
Cayman Islands Moldova 
Comoros Mongolia 
Cyprus Netherlands Antilles 
Equatorial Guinea North Korea 
Faroe Islands (FAS) Panama 
French International Ship Register (FIS) Sao Tome and Príncipe 
German International Ship Register (GIS) St Vincent 
Georgia Vanuatu 
Source: ITF, nd. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 is based on findings of the ITF and does not correspond with the research 
findings in this report in relation to poorly performing flag States. However it does 
highlight some of the issues and differences surrounding the definitions and 
criteria used to determine whether a State is a flag of convenience (ITF, 2012a). 
 
 
 
1.3.2 Open Registers 
 
The use of open registers has been growing steadily at around 5 million gross 
tonnes per month; this accounts for 86% of the new tonnage in the fleet (See 
Graph 1). Currently, over two thirds of the world’s gross tonnage use open 
registers (Stopford, 2011).  
 
There have always been fundamental economic factors determining the flag a 
ship will fly; the aim of maximizing revenue and minimizing costs is at the heart of 
ship operations (offshoregate, nd.). The FAO identify the benefits of open registers 
to ship owners as the following: ‘low or no vessel restrictions; favourable tax 
environment; low administration and registration fees; no or easy to meet 
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nationality requirements; quick and efficient registration process; flexible manning 
requirements; lower operational costs of the vessel.’ (FAO, 2012). Clearly having 
the choice of flag and nationality provides ship operators with a method of 
controlling the costs of operation. For the flag States the FAO (2012) identifies the 
economic benefits associated with operating an open register as the following: 
‘tonnage tax and registration fees, franchise and or royalty fees; and reduced 
governmental expense due to outsourcing.’  
 
 
Graph 1: The growth in open registrations 
 
 
. 
 
It is important to note that flag States operating open registers are not all ‘bad 
flags’. For example Panama now has a very good international reputation as a flag 
State and compared to the number of ships registered under this flag, there are 
relatively few accidents occurring (see Graph 8 and Table 3).  Despite this, all the 
flags listed on the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) ‘Black list’ are open 
registers.  
  
 
 
1.3.3 Why do Flag States exist at all? 
 
In international law a ship must have a nationality; if it does not have a nationality 
it does not have any protection in international law. Registration of a ship is the 
method by which a ship gains nationality. When a State accepts a ship onto its 
register of ships, the State then takes on the national and international 
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responsibilities  required by a flag State in relation to that ship. Individual States 
may decide for themselves the conditions of registration. 
 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, Article 91 
states: 
 
“Nationality of ships 
 
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to 
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its 
flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to 
fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.” 
 
There has been a great deal of discussion about what exactly constitutes a 
genuine link. It is the vagueness of the term ‘genuine link’ that fuelled the 
arguments of those who oppose the concept of open registers. The arguments still 
exist but are of a more academic nature now. The practical issue is whether those 
States that operate open registries meet the very clear obligations that 
international law places on them. Article 94 of UNCLOS establishes the 
fundamental principles. 
 
UNCLOS 1982, Article 94 states: 
 
“Duties of the flag State  
 
1. Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. 
 
2. In particular every State shall: 
 
(a) maintain a register of ships containing the names and particulars 
of ships flying its flag 
 
(b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying 
its flag and its master, officers and crew in respect of 
administrative, technical and social matters concerning the ship. 
 
3. Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are 
necessary to ensure safety at sea …… 
 
4. Such measures shall include those necessary to ensure:  
 
(a) that each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate 
intervals, is surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships … 
(b) that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who 
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possess appropriate qualifications … 
(c) that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew 
are fully conversant with and required to observe the applicable 
international …. 
 
5. In taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is 
required to conform to generally accepted international regulations, 
procedures and practices and to take any steps which may be necessary to 
secure their observance. 
 
6. A State which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction 
and control with respect to a ship have not been exercised may report the facts 
to the flag State. Upon receiving such a report, the flag State shall investigate 
the matter and, if appropriate, take any action necessary to remedy the 
situation. 
 
7. Each State shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably 
qualified person …  into every marine casualty or incident of 
navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing loss 
of life or serious injury to nationals of another State or serious damage to 
ships or installations of another State or to the marine environment.” 
 
Whilst Article 94 of UNCLOS is clear in detailing the obligations of a flag State the 
means by which flag States must achieve these obligations is less clear. Article 
94(5) establishes the link between municipal and international law. It provides the 
duty to “take any steps which may be necessary” to “conform to generally 
accepted international regulations”. 
 
The “generally accepted international regulations” are those concerning safety of 
life at sea, standards of training of seafarers, prevention of pollution, prevention of 
collisions, and the provision and maintenance of communications by radio. 
 
Flag States evidence their compliance with these international regulations by 
carrying out surveys and issuing certificates to ships on their registry. Flag States 
have the responsibility in international law for carrying out these functions, but in 
practice may sub-contract the administrative and technical functions to other 
organisations such as classification societies. In sub-contracting the administrative 
and technical functions they do not sub-contract the obligation of enforcement, 
they retain this responsibility. Article 217 of UNCLOS is clear that the enforcement 
of international regulations is the responsibility of the flag State: 
 
“Article 217 
 
Enforcement by flag States 
 
1. States shall ensure compliance by vessels flying their flag or of their 
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registry with applicable international rules and standards, established through 
the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference…. Flag 
States shall provide for the effective enforcement of such rules, standards, 
laws and regulations, irrespective of where a violation occurs.” 
 
It is the approach that some flag States take in discharging their duty of 
enforcement that attracts the less than scrupulous ship owner and has been a 
subject of contention for many years. 
 
 
1.3.4 What are the registration requirements and formalities? 
 
It is very difficult to provide a concise overview of the registration requirements 
and formalities as they vary from State to State. What is clear is that some States 
require a minimum level of information and registration can be affected in as little 
as one day, and some States have a more robust system requiring a much greater 
degree of information and carry out a series of cross checks on that information 
including carrying out a survey of the ship.  
 
 
There is no legal obligation for port States to carry out inspections on foreign 
flagged vessels entering their waters. States may choose to inspect visiting 
vessels for a variety of reasons. The scope of operations of a body such as the US 
Coast Guard is wide and it is driven wholly by domestic US law. Similarly those 
States who are members of the European Union may find that their practices in 
this area are driven both by internal policy and externally by European directives; 
these are often in response to accidents or incidents, for example, the sinking of 
the MV. Erika in December 1999 was the catalyst for many changes at European 
level. Aside from these internal drivers States may opt to cooperate with each 
other regionally. Memorandums of Understanding may be signed and a concerted 
effort of inspections, according to agreed criteria, is carried out by the member 
States.  
 
The response of the international community to those flag States who fail to 
ensure that ships on their registry meet the minimum of standards was to put in 
place a system whereby foreign flagged vessels were inspected in ports they 
visited; this is referred to as port State control (PSC). It goes without saying that if 
all flag States met their international obligations PSC would not be necessary.  
Whilst PSC has proved highly effective in identifying and to some degree 
eliminating sub-standard shipping it should never be seen as alternative to 
ensuring flag States meet their obligations.  
 
The right of a port State to carry out inspection on a foreign flagged vessel can be 
found in Article 218 of UNCLOS III, it states: 
“Article 218 
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Enforcement by port States 
1. When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, 
that State may undertake investigations and, where the evidence so warrants, 
institute proceedings in respect of any discharge from that vessel outside the 
internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that State in violation 
of applicable international rules and standards established through the competent 
international organization or general diplomatic conference. 
2. No proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be instituted in respect of a 
discharge violation in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic 
zone of another State unless requested by that State, the flag State, or a State 
damaged or threatened by the discharge violation, …. 
3. When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, 
that State shall, as far as practicable, comply with requests from any State for 
investigation of a discharge violation …. 
4. The records of the investigation carried out by a port State pursuant to this 
article shall be transmitted upon request to the flag State or to the coastal State … 
Reference to “applicable international rules and standards established through the 
competent international organization or general diplomatic conference” is 
accepted as referring to the key International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
instruments such as; 
International Convention on Load Lines 1966 (LL 66), 
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships 1969 (TONNAGE 
69), 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS 74), 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as modified by 
the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78) and 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch 
keeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW 78) 
International Labour Organisations (ILO) Convention 147, Merchant Shipping 
(Minimum Standards) Convention 1976.  
ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (ratified August 2012, in force August 
2013). 
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In order to maintain a consistency across port States, IMO resolutions have been 
adopted and the IMO introduced guidelines on how port State inspections should 
be carried out. 
1.4 Port State Control Inspections 
Inspections may be undertaken for a number of reasons: 
i. On the initiative of the port State authorities, 
ii. At the request of a third party, or  
iii. As result of information received by a member of the ship’s crew, a 
professional body or trade union. 
The port State control officer (PSCO) on boarding a ship will inspect the ships’ 
certificates and documents. If the certificates are valid and the documents 
satisfactory, and the general impression of the ship meets the PSCO’s 
expectations, the inspection will concentrate on any reported or observed 
deficiencies. If the initial inspection reveals deficiencies and the PSCO has clear 
grounds to believe that the ship, its equipment or crew do not meet acceptable 
standards, then a more detailed inspection will take place. 
In theory, but perhaps not always in practice, all deficiencies must be rectified prior 
to the ship departing the port. However, if the ship is either unsafe to proceed to 
sea or the deficiencies on the ship are so serious that they will have to be rectified 
before the ship sails, the ship will be detained, irrespective of the time the ship is 
scheduled to stay in port. It should be noted that PSC cannot compel a ship to 
affect repairs in a particular port, but it can issue a formal prohibition of a ship 
continuing an operation due to established deficiencies which, individually or 
together, would render the continued operation hazardous. The flag State will be 
notified in writing of the outcome of the inspection and includes a report of 
inspection. 
 
1.4.1 Regional Port State Control Agreements 
 
The coordination of port State control activities by groups of port States working 
under a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) has enabled a more unified 
approach to inspection. The maritime authorities of the member States can avoid, 
or target, ships which have been inspected by fellow members in proceeding 
months. There are 10 port State control regimes (see Table 2), eight of which are 
MOUs, one of which is an Agreement (The Acuerdo de Vina del Mar Agreement, 
Latin America) and The US Coast Guard, which operates their own regime as a 
stand-alone Authority but do cooperate with other maritime authorities.   
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Table 2: Port State Control Regimes1.  
MOU Covering Date Effective 
US coastguard port State 
control 
The USA 1975 
Paris European coastal States and 
the North Atlantic basin from 
North America to Europe 
1978 
Acuerdo de Viña del Mar 
Agreement  
Latin America 1992 
Tokyo Asia and the Pacific 1994 
Caribbean Caribbean 1996 
Mediterranean Mediterranean 1997 
Indian Ocean Indian Ocean 1999 
Abuja West and Central Africa 1999 
Black Sea The Black Sea region 2000 
Riyadh Arab States of the Gulf 2004 
Source: Original 
 
 
 
 
1.4.2 Ship selection criteria 
 
The selection criteria for inspections, whilst following similar principles, differs from 
MOU to MOU; each however sets a minimum percentage of vessels that member 
authorities will inspect. Along with the practical steps of detaining sub-standard 
ships MOU’s collect and collate data on ships. This data is shared between 
member States and made publically available. This enables organisations such as 
classification societies, ship owner associations and the International Transport 
Workers Federation to coordinate their activities 
 
The data collected is crucial to the MOU’s work in classifying ships and their flags; 
this enables them to prioritise and target those ships that are registered with flag 
States that are known to have a poor record of inspection and enforcement of their 
own ships, a much more efficient use of PSC resources. The Paris MOU was the 
first to publish three lists of flag States performance (See Appendix B). 
 
i. The “White List” indicating the quality flags; 
ii. The “Grey List” for flags with an average PSC score; and 
iii. The “Black List” for flags with a consistent poor safety record 
The ‘White, Grey and Black List’ presents the full spectrum, from quality flags to 
flags with a poor performance that are considered high or very high risk. It is 
                                                 
1
 See Appendix A for table of MOU member countries 
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based on the total number of inspections and detentions over a 3-year rolling 
period for flags with at least 30 inspections in the period. The Tokyo MOU later 
adopted the same methodology as the Paris MOU for the assessment of 
performance of flags. It is a standard formula for statistical calculations in which 
certain values are fixed in accordance with the agreement of the Port State 
Control Committee of the MOU (Paris MOU, 2012). 
 
There is no list identifying those States actively involved in port State control. The 
member States of the various MOUs are clearly visible in their activities, 
membership is public and annual reports are published. Individual State activity on 
the scale of the US, who are a not member of an MOU, can be clearly identified. 
However, the level of engagement by States who are not members of an MOU is 
harder to identify, as is the criteria by which they select vessels for inspection. It 
should not be concluded that PSC is universally carried out across the globe. 
 
 
 
1.5 Hiding Corporate Identity 
 
Ensuring effective implementation and enforcement of international maritime 
conventions and the compliance of owners and ships, is a major challenge for flag 
States. Despite this many flag States do not require disclosure of beneficial 
ownership as a condition for registering ships and some actively advertise secrecy 
as a benefit of registering ships to their flag (Gianni, 2008).  
 
In 2003, the Maritime Transport Committee of the OECD scrutinised ship 
registration provisions of various ship registers. The report was designed to 
assess the possibilities available to beneficial owners, who for one reason or 
another might wish to remain anonymous. The Report of the UN Secretary 
General’s Consultative Group on Flag State Implementation (2004) highlights the 
key points from the OECD Report as follows. ‘It is very easy, and comparatively 
inexpensive, to establish a complex web of corporate entities to provide very 
effective cover to the identities of beneficial owners who do not want to be known’ 
(Gianni, 2008). The mechanisms to invoke anonymity are legally available in many 
jurisdictions and can provide an international business corporation that can 
conduct business nearly anywhere in the world. For the reasons identified, this 
report does not look at shipping companies or organisations. 
 
 
 
1.6 Shipping accidents as drivers of maritime legislation 
 
It has long been recognized that one of the key measures of improving safety at 
sea is to develop, implement and enforce international regulations. History has 
demonstrated that large-scale shipping accidents serve as key drivers of change, 
which is often manifested in new or amended safety regulation (Charlebois, 2012). 
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The timeline in Figure 1 highlights the drivers for change through the introduction 
of new or updated legislation attributed to major incidents or a series of incidents 
focusing on the past 15 years. For example, the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
Convention traces its origins to the loss of the Titanic (1912) with significant 
updates in more recent years, such as the introduction of the ISM Code (Chapter 
IX of SOLAS) after the lessons learnt from the loss of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise in 1987. Similarly changes have taken place to regulations governing 
the operation of dry bulk carriers and tankers, including inter alia the amended 
Bulk Code, amendments to MARPOL Annex I, and the introduction of the US 
legislation such as the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA ’90). These were triggered by 
the large number of dry bulk carrier losses in the 1980s, most notably the 
Derbyshire in 1980, and the grounding of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker in 1989. 
 
This retrospective amendment of legislation continues; the loss of the MV. Erika in 
1999 saw changes to the operation of tankers and new European Regulations.  
The serious fire on the cruise ship the Star Princess in 2006 brought changes to 
fire regulations. It remains to be seen what affect the cruise ship the Costa 
Concordia (2012) will have after such a serious loss of life. Other contributing 
factors to improved vessel safety and reduction in shipping accidents should also 
be considered such as the introduction of the International Safety Management 
(ISM) code (adopted 1994), the increasing role of port State control with regard to 
vessel inspections and detentions and the increasing role of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) for shipping companies.  
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Figure 1: The 15 year time line and key shipping accidents and subsequent 
changes in maritime safety legislation.  
  
 
  
 
1980 
MV. Derbyshire - Loss of life 
  
 
1987 Herald of Free Enterprise - Loss of Life 
  
 
1989 Exxon Valdez - Oil spill 
SOLAS Ch VI                   
International Grain Code 
 
1990   
MARPOL Annex 1 
Double hull 
amendments 
 
1992   
  
 
1994 MS Estonia -  Loss of life 
STCW 95                             
MARPOL Protocol 
 
1997 
  
ISM Code 1 
 
1998   
SOLAS Ch XII                        
Bulk Code amendments  
 
1999 Erika - Oil spill 
  
  
  
  
 
2000   
  
 
2001   
ISM Code II                           
PAL Protocol                
 
2002 Prestige -Oil spill 
FUND Protocol 
 
2003   
Creation of EMSA 
  
  
Erika I (EU) 
  
  
SOLAS Ch VI                           
Revised Bulk Code 
 
2004 
  
Erika II (EU) 
  
  
  
 
2005   
  
 
2006 Star Princess - Loss of life 
  
 
2007   
  
 
2008   
3rd Maritime Safety 
Package (Erika III) 
 
2009   
STCW 95 Manilla 
amendments                      
HNS Protocol 
 
2010 
  
International Maritime 
Solid Bulk Code 
 
2011   
  
 
2012  Costa Concordia - Loss of life 
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2.0 Current trends and data presentation 
 
The following graphs and tables summarise factual information held in the public 
domain from the past 15 years, which provide information that can help in 
assessing the factors which are more likely to contribute to shipping accidents. As 
with any statistics it is important to use these tables and graphs with care and take 
into consideration other underlying issues at play, including the supporting 
evidence provided by the interviews. The graphs have been grouped accordingly: 
 
 Growth of the world fleet 
 Losses by incident type 
 Losses by geographical area  
 Losses by average age of vessel 
 Losses by vessel type 
 Losses by registration 
 Losses as a percentage of registered fleet 
 Information from the MOUs 
 
Losses, unless otherwise stated, in this research refer sea going propelled 
merchant ships ‘not less that 100gt which as a result of being a marine casualty 
[have] ceased to exist, are irrecoverable, or have subsequently been broken up’ 
(World casualty statistics, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Growth of the world fleet 
 
The total number of vessel losses in Graph 2 shows a decrease in numbers for 
2011 following a peak the previous year. These figures need to be considered in 
conjunction with the steady increase of the world’s merchant fleet (over 100gt) 
which has seen a rise of an additional 15,846 vessels over the past decade, 
representing a growth of 18.1%, (see Graph 3). This demonstrates an overall 
decline in the number of vessels lost (World casualty Statistics 1997 - 2011). 
Despite this encouraging statistic it is clear that the number of global vessel losses 
on an annual basis is still consistently far too high, indicating a requirement to 
understand and take action against the root causes of such accidents. 
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Graph 2: Yearly number of vessel losses (> 100gt) 1997 – 2011 
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Graph 3: Growth of the world’s merchant fleet  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original 
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Other contributing factors to improved vessel safety and reduction in shipping 
accidents should also be considered, such as the introduction of the International 
Safety Management (ISM) code (adopted 1994), the increasing role of port State 
control with regard to vessel inspections and detentions and the importance of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) within most shipping companies. Although 
this data shows a generally improving trend in shipping accidents, there are still 
significant numbers of incidences which can be attributed to factors affecting the 
vessel itself, such as its age and type, through to the vessel’s geographical area of 
operation, as discussed below. 
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2.2 Total losses by incident type 
 
The data in Graph 4 shows that the most common incident type consistently 
occurring is foundering. This accounts for approximately 50% of all the annual ship 
losses. Foundering is defined by ISL (2010) as, ‘Sinking due to rough weather, 
leaks, breaking in two etc, but not due to other categories such as collision [and so 
on]’. Foundering incidences are clearly associated with the geographical area they 
occur in and the extreme weather conditions often experienced in such locations, 
as discussed in section 3.3. These incidences also occur in areas such as the 
North Sea and the Black Sea where there are high volumes of shipping and many 
coastal trading routes associated with short sea shipping. The second major 
cause of loss by incident type is associated with wrecked or stranded vessels, 
which is defined as ‘Striking the sea bottom, shore or underwater wrecks. Also 
termed “Grounding” (ISL, 2010). However this attributes to less than half of those 
that are foundered. Project Horizon, a research project looking at the effects of 
sleepiness on the cognitive performance of maritime watch keepers, stated that 
marine insurance statistics have shown that human error is a major contributing 
factor in about 60% of shipping accidents, with other research suggesting that this 
figure significantly increases in the case of collisions and groundings (Project 
Horizon, 2012). 
 
 
Graph 4: Total losses and incident type  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original 
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2.3 Losses by geographical area  
 
The losses by geographical area shown in Graph 4 only cover a 12 year period 
from 1999 to 2011, as these were the only statistics available from the World 
Casualty Statistics (1999 - 2011). The geographical areas that are most prevalent 
(in order) are the South China Seas and East Indies, Japan and Korea and the 
East Mediterranean and Black Sea. The losses in the Far Eastern region could be 
significant if a relationship is made with the data for number of vessels which have 
foundered. Meteorological conditions in specific areas have a significant bearing 
on the number of incidences occurring. Tropical storms, tsunamis and typhoons 
are prevalent in the Asia Pacific region where extreme and changeable weather 
and sea states are common (Cornish and Ives,1997; Craig, 2006). Additionally 
whilst bulk carriers, tankers and container vessels commonly travel through this 
area, one of the most predominant types of vessel trading here is the general 
cargo ship.  These ships are well suited to trade in the island and archipelagic 
States of the region, as they can engage in the ‘tramp’ trade where they have no 
specific route or schedule, carrying the smaller quantities of cargo that are 
required. However these vessels also tend to have an older age profile, generally 
above 20 years (World Casualty Statistics 2000-2011) and as such tend to be 
flagged with open registries as many national registers impose restrictions on the 
age of vessel they will register. There is also a possibility that these vessels may 
cut corners to save money, which could mean taking risks and sailing in potentially 
dangerous weather conditions, in sub-standard vessels, with sub-standard crews. 
The combination of these factors could be of considerable significance to vessels 
lost to foundering. For example the ITF (2012b) highlights the frequency of serious 
accidents in the Black Sea region, suggesting that the Black Sea trade is 
characterized by ‘The use of aged, smaller vessels, working well beyond their 
economic life and moving low value goods, [and this is] reflected in serious 
accidents ….’ (ITF, 2012b). 
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Figure two shows the complex network of global cargo ship movements between 
ports during 2007. The researchers (Kaaluza et. al. 2012) used the itineries of 
16,363 ships over 10,000 GT to build a picture of activity over one year. The 
colour scale shows the number of journeys along each route.  
 
 
Figure 2: The global cargo shipping movements for 2007  
 
 
Source: Kaaluza et. al., 2010 
 
 
When Figure 2 is compared with Figure three, the world map indicating the top ten 
incident zones between 1999 and 2011, it is clear that many of the areas where 
shipping traffic is heaviest marries up.  Many of the highlighted regions are also on 
the financial radar for higher insurance premiums. The maps provide a clear 
indicator of potential problem areas and should be a focus of international 
attention for increased safety measures and enforcement of regulations and high 
standards. 
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Figure 3: World map indicating top ten incident zones 1999-2011 
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Graph 5: Losses by geographical area  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original 
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2.4 Losses by average age of vessel 
 
Graph 6 shows that the average age of vessels lost between 1997 and 2011 are 
all above 20 years with a small but steady increase over the last 15 years. The 
age of vessels has been discussed in relation to geographical area of operation, 
but is also a consideration to some IACs members who will not class sea-going 
vessels over 20 years old.  
 
 
Graph 6: Losses by average age of vessel 
 
 
Source: Original 
 
 
 
2.5 Losses by vessel type 
 
Graph 7 shows that general cargo vessels account for nearly 50% of all vessel 
types lost at sea over the research timeframe. These types of vessels are often 
operating short sea shipping routes, particularly in the Far East which involve 
many port calls, navigating in congested coastal areas with the risk of difficult 
hydrographic uncertainties, such as submerged reefs and rocks. By their design 
these vessels can carry a multitude of cargos and are therefore more predisposed 
to trading in this way, as discussed in Section 3.3.  
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Graph 7: Losses by vessel type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original 
 
 
2.6 Losses by registration 
 
When considering cumulative losses by registration (Graph 8), the number of 
registered vessels in the fleet must also be examined for a clearer view of actual 
numbers. For example, although Panama appears to have the seventh highest 
cumulative losses by flag registration, it also has the highest number of registered 
ships in a fleet which has been steadily growing over the past 15 years. When 
looking at flags such as Cambodia where the fleet size is relatively small (591 in 
2011) it is clear that they have suffered significant cumulative losses to their flag. 
This is a recurrent theme which also applies, in particular, to Jordan and Moldova 
where the registered fleet size is relatively small in relation to the number of vessel 
losses incurred.   
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Graph 8: Cumulative losses as a percentage of registered fleet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original 
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1997
Registered 
Fleet
As  % of 
world 
fleet
vessels 
lost
As % of 
flag 
fleet 2011
Registered 
Fleet
As % of 
world 
fleet
vessels 
lost
As % of 
flag 
fleet
PANAMA 6188 7.24 8 0.129 PANAMA 8127 7.792 22 0.271
USA 5260 6.15 11 3.230 INDONESIA 6332 6.071 5 0.079
RUSSIA 4814 5.63 1 0.021 JAPAN 5619 5.387 10 0.178
CYPRUS 1650 1.93 6 0.364 CHINA, PR 4148 3.977 3 0.072
GREECE 1641 1.92 2 0.122 LIBERIA 3030 2.905 1 0.033
MALTA 1378 1.61 2 0.145 KOREA, SOUTH 2916 2.796 3 0.103
ST VINCENT 1343 1.57 7 0.521 MALTA 1815 1.740 5 0.275
BAHAMAS 1221 1.43 3 0.246 VIETNAM 1525 1.462 2 0.131
TURKEY 1146 1.34 7 0.611 BAHAMAS 1409 1.351 1 0.071
INDIA 941 1.10 3 0.319 CYPRUS 1022 0.980 1 0.098
THAILAND 576 0.67 5 0.868 CAMBODIA 591 0.567 7 1.184
ANTIGUA & BAR. 516 0.60 4 0.775 BELIZE 446 0.428 2 0.448
HK CHINA 375 0.44 1 0.267 JORDAN 23 0.022 1 4.348
World total fleet 85,494 World total fleet 104,305
 
2.7 Losses as a percentage of registered fleet 
 
In total the percentage loss of the registered fleet may appear small but is of 
serious consequence when considering the implied potential loss of life, impacts to 
the environment and finances of the ship owner (Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Total of world’s registered fleet as recorded losses of >10,000gt in 1997 
and 2011. 
 
Source: Original 
 
 
For example, this means that in 2011 Pamama had 8,127 vessels in its registered 
fleet, which equated to 7.79% of the total world fleet. In this year they lost 22 
vessels, which equates to 0.271 of their fleet which is a relatively small number 
when compared to flags such as Jordan. In the same year Jordan had 23 
registered vessels in their fleet. They lost 1 in 2011 representing an overall loss of 
4.348% of their registered fleet, clearly a much higher percentage. 
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2.8 Information from the MOUs 
 
It is the IMO’s policy to encourage the establishment of regional port State control 
organizations and agreements on port State control (IMO, 2012), as discussed in 
section 1.3.1. The following graphs look at a number of statistics collated from the 
MOUs. These primarily focus on the Paris MOU as this has the most 
comprehensive data set, having been in operation the longest, since 1978. 
However, it should be noted that even this MOU has only the bare minimum of 
data collected over the total time period studied (15 years). Data collection for the 
Paris MOU became much more thorough from around 2009 and for this reason 
much of the detention information reported is from this period.  
 
The Tokyo MOU also has a more comprehensive reporting system, although it 
was not initiated until 1994. Until recently none of the data collected for the various 
MOUs matched up, with criteria reported on varying broadly. Additionally the 
information collected from the World Casualty lists are not using consistent criteria 
or terminology with the MOUs, which makes it difficult to cross reference like for 
like between the two data sets.  
 
Table 4 demonstrates the range of data that the MOUs have collected over the 
past 15 years and highlights the disparity in regional approaches to detention 
monitoring. For example, the Abuja MOU website database has a list of which 
classification societies had ships detained, but unlike the Paris and Tokyo MOU 
they are not linked to specific ships or flags, so there is no way of telling if there is 
a link between which ships are classified under which society and their 
performance. This is the same for vessel type. Additionally some MOUs such as 
the Caribbean MOU was open for signatories in 1996 but it appears from their 
website that data was not available to the public until 2009. The IMO interviewee 
mentioned that this is an area they are working on with port State regimes to 
rectify. It is recognised that the data must be reported on in a standardised and 
consistent way in order for it to be meaningful and to allow for cross referencing 
and verification. Therefore the following graphs provide snapshots of certain 
statistics only and are supported by published literature and the interview data. 
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Table 4: Data available from MOUs from 1997 - 2012 
Source: Original 
 
 
Name 
of 
MOU 
Year 
MOU 
Signed 
Data Available 
from 
Ship 
Flag 
Year 
Build 
Gross 
Tonnage 
Class 
Society 
Year of 
Detention 
Reasons 
for being 
detained 
Ship Type Place of 
Inspection 
Paris 1978 Limited data 
from 1997. Full 
details from 
2009 
Since 
1997 
Since 
2008 
Since 
2008 
Since 2008 Since 1997 Since 2009 Since 1997 Since 2009 
Tokyo 1994 Since 1999 Since 
1999 
Since 
1999 
Since 
1999 
Since 
1999 
Since 1999 Since 1999 Since 1999 Since 1999 
Medite
rranea
n 
1997 Since 2005 Since 
2005 
Since 
2005 
Since 
2005 
Since 2005 Since 2005 Since 2005 Since 2005 Since 2005 
Riyadh 2004 Limited data 
available 
between 2007-
2009 
No No No No 2007- 2009 No No 2007-2009 
Abuja 1999 Limited data for 
2008, 2010, 
2011 & no data 
for 2009 
2008, 
2010, 
2011 
No No Limited, to 
number 
per class 
not linked 
to a flag 
2008  
2010 
2011 
No Limited, to 
number per 
type not 
linked to a 
flag 
No 
Indian 
Ocean 
1999 Limited since 
2002 further 
data available 
from 2005 
Since 
2002 
Since 
2002 
Since 
2000 
Since  
2002 
Since  
2002 
No Since  
2002 
Since  
2002 
Caribb
ean 
1996 Since  
2009 
No No Since 
2009 
Since  
2009 
Since 
 2009 
No Since  
2009 
Since 
2009 
Black 
Sea 
2000 Since  
2002 
Since 
2002 
Since 
2002 
Since 
2002 
Yes 
but limited 
information  
Since  
2002 
Since  
2002 
Since  
2002 
Since  
2002 
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Due to the limited amount of consistent data available for the MOUs, all the graphs 
below use information collected from the Paris MOU. 
 
 
Graph 9A indicates the number of flags banned from the Paris MOU between 
January 2011 and April 2012. Of the vessels banned, 14 were for multiple 
detentions, 3 failed to call the indicated repair yard and 2 jumped detention. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 9A: Number of vessels banned from the Paris MOU, Jan 2011 to April 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original 
 
 
 
Graph 9B below shows the flags which had over a 10% detention rate compared 
with the number of vessels inspected from the Paris MOU region. In 2011 the age 
of the vessels was recorded so the detention rate has been compared with this 
(Graph 9C), however for the other years identified this was not possible. As 
Graphs 9B, D, and E show over this three year period, the following flags appear 
year on year as having a detention rate greater than 10%: Albania, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya and Sierra Leone. 
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Graph 9B:  Flags with highest detention rates 2011  
 
Source: Original 
 
 
Graph 9B therefore shows, for example, that 54% of vessels flagged in Boliva 
were detained by the Paris MOU in 2011, statistically making it the worst 
performing flag for that year. 
 
 
 
Graph 9C: Average age of vessels flagged under those with the highest detention 
rates for 2011 
 
Source: Original 
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Graph 9D: Flags with the highest detention rates for 2010 
 
Source: Original 
 
 
 
Graph 9E: Flags with the highest detention rates for 2009 
 
Source: Original 
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From the data available 2009 – 2011, the type of vessel detained can be noted 
per flag, with the most commonly detained vessels being general cargo vessels. 
Additionally these usually involve older vessels (as seen in Graph 9C) and are 
therefore more likely to have greater numbers of deficiencies leading to higher 
detention rates. This is demonstrated in the graphs below 9F, G and H. 
 
General cargo/ multi-purpose vessel type refers to ships with more than one 
function, for example one that carries oil and containers (Graph 9F). The vessel 
type known as ‘special activities’ is likely to relate to ships such as fishery vessels 
or tugs, although this is unclear. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 9F: Highest detention rates by vessel type, 2011 
 
Source: Original 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  39 
Graph 9G: Highest detention rates by vessel type, 2010 
 
Source: Original 
 
 
 
Graph 9H: Highest detention rates by vessel type, 2009 
 
Source: Original 
 
 
 
  40 
2.0 Discussion and key messages from the data  
 
This section presents a discussion based on the key messages from the data 
findings and looks at them in relation to the relevant legal instruments and the 
current debate in this field. 
 
3.1 Key messages 
 
The shipping industry is inherently global and performs around the clock in many 
different time zones. The world fleet is steadily growing and operates in an 
increasing intense, economically driven environment where cost savings are a 
fundamental part of business. These and other data findings presented in this 
report show a complex picture of factors that are strongly linked to shipping 
accidents. 
 
Despite the historical data which demonstrates overall improvements in the 
number of shipping accidents, there is still a need to make progress with tackling 
the associated underlying causes and to reduce incidences further. This is 
particularly pertinent during a time of economic downturn when there might be a 
temptation for owners and operators to cut corners but also as the global fleet size 
is predicted to increase significantly over a number of decades. This implies there 
will be more ships operating in high risk areas such as those identified on the ‘Top 
Ten Incident Zones’ map (Figure 3) and in areas where potential new shipping 
routes may be established, such as the Arctic, and resource rich areas such as 
the West coast of Canada. It is important that proactive consideration of these 
potential high risk areas is taken to avert the risk of shipping accidents in the 
future in these highly sensitive and bio-diverse areas. 
 
This report shows that there is the greatest probability of a shipping accident 
occurring when all of the following factors act together. 
 
 Key hotspot locations (S.E. Asia (particularly the Coral Triangle area), the 
E. Med/ Black Sea, N,Sea/ British Isles) 
 Age of Vessels (over 10 years) 
 A minority of poorly performing flag States 
 Vessel type (General Cargo 42%/ fisheries 24%) 
Some flag States are still not behaving responsibly. This can be evidenced by 
certain flags experiencing higher than normal incidences (Graph 8) and registering 
older vessels. Examples in the report include St. Kitts and Nevis and Moldova, 
among others. However, this point raises questions. Are these flag States being 
remiss in their duty of safety at sea or is it because they register older vessels 
which are statistically involved in a higher number of incidences? (See Table 1 for 
the current list of Flags of Convenience, Appendix A for PARIS MOU Black, grey 
and white list, 2011, and Appendix C for the ICS flag performance list). 
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General cargo vessels account for 42% of all vessel types lost at sea over the 
research timeframe (Graph 6). These types of vessels are often operating short 
sea shipping routes, associated with tramp trading, particularly in the South East 
Asian region which involve many port calls, navigating in congested coastal areas 
with the risk of hydrographic uncertainties such as submerged reefs and rocks. 
They often involve older vessels of 10 years and above which can limit their 
registration to less reputable flags States in order to continue trading. This can 
establish a cycle of potentially a lowering of standards and cutting safety corners. 
The South East Asia region, where the majority of these incidences are occurring, 
is often referred to as the Coral Triangle as it is an area particularly rich in 
biodiversity and therefore especially vulnerable to the potential of shipping 
accidents (Figure 3). 
 
The report highlights that fishing vessels are also involved in a high number of 
shipping incidences, amounting to 24% of the total world’s fleet for this vessel 
type. This number could be potentially higher given that accidents involving fishing 
vessels are often under reported. 
 
Nearly 50% of all global shipping accidents fall into the foundered category, which 
is strongly linked to location and the type and age of vessels operating there. This 
is also strongly associated with human factors, particularly related to sleep 
deprivation and shift work, which can lead to errors of judgment when handling a 
ship. 
 
There are many other complexities that contribute to safety at sea and shipping 
accidents, including the following: 
Some IACS members will not class sea-going vessels over 20 years old thus 
effectively pushing older and potentially more vulnerable vessels to poorer 
standard class societies.  The report highlights that there are still a minority of 
significantly badly performing flags which negatively impact on the reputation of 
the shipping industry. There is a need for the industry to promote best 
performance in flags, particularly the ones that have significantly ‘cleaned up their 
act’ in the last 15 years or so. Long term this provides more business and 
improves reputation of a flag. 
 
There is a need to encourage countries to ratify and implement IMO Conventions 
and regulations as well as international regulations such as UNCLOS (which the 
US have not yet ratified), the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) and others 
that govern marine environmental protection and behaviour/operations whilst at 
sea, and monitor shipping performance. It is important that this information is 
made publicly available so that business decisions can be made in an informed 
way and operated on a level playing field.  The fact that some conventions and 
regulations have not entered into force for decades or that certain countries have 
never ratified means a base line has not been established in terms of global 
regulation. While some countries continue to improve in this regard, others 
continue to get worse. 
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There is a need to standardise recorded data, particularly between the MOUs and 
to use the same metrics for undertaking this. Genuinely global standardised 
regimes do not yet exist in this context which can cause confusion, 
misinterpretation of data and potentially poorly performing flags to slip through the 
net. This becomes more problematic set against a growing world fleet and 
congested shipping hotspot areas which increase the probability of accidents.  
Future focus on this area is a key recommendation. 
 
 
3.2 Weaknesses in the existing legal instruments: Should the genuine link concept 
by tightened? 
 
The issue of nationality of a ship is frequently cited as an area open to misuse, 
where the concept of a genuine link between the ship and the State to which is 
flagged can at times be tenuous.  The conditions governing genuine link between 
ship owner and registration were initially laid down in the Convention on the High 
Seas in the 1950s, and took account of ship ownership and registration models in 
place at that time. When it was incorporated into the United Nations Convention of 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) little was changed, even though discussion had 
moved on from conditions of registration to that of sub-standard ships in general. 
UNCLOS III addressed sub-standard shipping by providing more detailed 
provision with regard to effective jurisdiction for flag States and coastal and port 
States. The lack of change within UNCLOS III, with regard to genuine link, may 
reflect the fact that this issue had been taken up by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which had been looking at 
registrations of ships since the 1970’s.  After the ratification of UNCLOS III in 
1982, the United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships (the 
Registration Convention) was concluded by UNCTAD; however it had limited 
success. Furthermore, it is often ignored by the industry in discussions relating to 
genuine link, where efforts have concentrated on improving effective jurisdiction 
and control, particularly that of the port State.  
 
It is suggested that the timing may be appropriate to re-visit the issue of who can 
offer nationality to merchant shipping as this has implications with regard to 
jurisdiction and control of these ships. This would seek to prevent the very 
existence of some open registries. Alternatively greater focus could be directed to 
whether flag States are exercising effective jurisdiction and control over ships that 
fly their flags. This would accept that any State may operate a ships registry but 
that they must be more effective in exercising jurisdiction and control over ships 
and their owners to whom they grant nationality.  The International Transport 
Worker’s Federation are clear in their assertions that, ‘there should be a “genuine 
link” between the real owner of the vessel and the flag the vessel flies.’ They state 
that ‘there is no “genuine link” in the case of ‘Flags of Convenience’ registries (ITF, 
2012). 
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3.2.1 Should effective enforcement by flag States be strengthened? 
 
Those flag States, identified by the various Port State Control Agreements, as 
consistently being deficient in meeting their obligations in international law to 
“effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and 
social matters over ships flying its flag” should be targeted to ensure they clean up 
their act. If they are not already members of Port State Control Agreements, for 
example an MOU, they could be encouraged to participate in their regional 
agreement and take advantage of the technical support facilitated by the IMO.  
 
The role of the flag State in carrying out investigations has been strengthened by 
the IMO. A knowledge based approach to the rule making process could use, for 
instance, casualty and Port State control data. A great deal can be learnt from 
casualty investigation.  A mandatory framework has been developed by the IMO, 
which provides a clear way of carrying out an investigation. This Code promotes 
cooperation amongst States carrying out joint investigations leading to greater 
transparency.  By having a standard process for casualty analysis and by making 
the information available to all States, meaningful insight into the causes of 
accidents and any lessons learnt from the data can be used to prevent 
reoccurrences. 
 
The IMO clearly recognize that flag State performance is ultimately down to 
monitoring the work of the people who act on their behalf,  
 
 ‘because they are the ones entering whether a ship has been well surveyed, 
things which are wrong, that deficiencies have been rectified, that the right people 
are on board, that everything is in order.’  
 
They explain that they have seen changes in the way some flag States choose to 
operate, 
 
 ‘Some of those [flag States] have also decided to scale down to ensure the critical 
number of ships they can manage’.  
 
 
3.2.2 Enforcement by Port State Control 
 
The success of PSC in identifying and publicising flag States who fail to meet their 
international obligations should be recognized, and where necessary further 
encouraged and strengthened. The strength of Port State Control is the 
coordinated approach taken regionally. Greater cooperation between MOU’s 
internationally should be encouraged particularly in the areas highlighted as 
hotspots of sub-standard shipping. 
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Greater cooperation between flag and port States is an area the IMO is exerting 
considerable effort to further encourage and support. Cooperation through the 
IMO FSI sub-committee provides a forum to rectify the causes of deficiencies and 
improve the safety of vessels. This should be supported. 
 
The use of incentive schemes, such as the United States ‘Qualship 21’ should 
also be encouraged because they inspect the level of compliance with 
international standard. Schemes such as this and the ‘lists’ operated by some port 
State control MOU may also have an impact on flag State compliance, it may be 
considered bad for business if ships flying your flag are “black” listed and targeted 
for inspection in areas their owners wish to trade.  
 
 
 
 
4.0 Recommendations 
 
Based on the research findings several recommendations can be made to help 
strengthen various aspects of shipping safety standards. The recommendations 
focus on several areas of the shipping industry which contribute towards vessel 
and seafarer safety and reflect the complexity of finding a one stop solution to 
decreasing shipping accidents. Whilst the recommendations address the issues 
raised in the report, they also highlight areas where future research would be 
instrumental in providing greater knowledge that could potentially instigate long 
term safety improvements within the shipping industry.  
 
The continual growth of the industry, yearly recorded accidents and the potential 
for a large scale disasters occurring, reinforces the need for continual support for 
an integrated, global, legislative response to increase vessel safety standards. 
This is slowly being achieved through the IMO and highlights the importance of 
ratification by flag States of its conventions. 
 
Increased enforcement of global legislation through the port and flag States would 
produce more cohesive and effective results for shipping safety. Whilst this is 
recognised as an inherently complex area, it is important that focus remains on 
those ports and flag States that are not complying with international regulations. 
 
Monitoring work conducted by some of the MOUs fails to encompass several key 
elements of information such as age of vessel and location of incident for 
example. Despite the IMOs continual efforts in this regard, the data collected is 
often inconsistent for different years and there appears to be a lack of 
collaboration across all the MOUs to standardise the approach taken to data 
collection and monitoring, resulting in a lack of data quality. There needs to be a 
common base-line which could be achieved by the development of a global 
standardised framework for data collection and reporting. Investment into research 
in this area is highly recommended.  
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Support and encouragement should be given for greater cooperation between the 
various MOUs, particularly in the geographical hotspots where incidences most 
occur. This would help to coordinate efforts on detaining sub-standard shipping 
and help to ensure that deficiencies are rectified as soon as possible 
 
Currently there is a lack of collaborative exchange of data between the port State 
regimes. Sharing data of shipping accidents and the recommendations made on 
the strength of them can be a positive outcome of the incident. It is therefore 
crucial that information is made easily accessible, publically available and at no 
cost, in order to promote transparency and the sharing of best practice. 
 
This report has shown that vessels over 20 years of age often start a geographical 
move East (to the Black Sea area and then the Far East) when they are no longer 
able to register with better known registries. This is particularly the case with 
general cargo vessels which can be adaptable with their trade and route. The age 
of the vessel means that maintenance is more important than ever but often works 
against the ship as it is no longer able to register with a registry holding a good 
reputation. These registries generally impose more stringent and greater safety 
standards such as on-board management systems. Keeping a ship with a good 
registry will help achieve better safety standards overall and therefore this is an 
important issue that needs to be looked at in collaboration with those registries 
that could have a positive impact on maritime safety. 
 
Finally, this report has touched on the human elements involved with shipping 
accidents which include the competency of crews, their employment conditions, 
and their training; Organisational, national and safety cultures and even human 
fallibilities like fatigue and situation awareness. This is a vast area and there has 
been much research surrounding these issues in the past. A future 
recommendation would be to tie the existing research in this field to this current 
study. 
 
 
The recommendations can be summarised by the following points: 
 
 Encourage a more global and cohesive approach towards shipping safety 
through support for the IMO in its pragmatic approach to encouraging flag 
States to ratify its conventions. 
 Advocacy to improve poorer performing flag State standards through 
increased enforcement to produce a more effective and joined up 
approach. 
 Standardised data collection and reporting mechanisms across the MOUs. 
 Investment in research and design to develop a global frame work for a 
standardised reporting system to enable commonality of data collection, 
monitoring and reporting of shipping accidents and detentions at various 
levels. This would help to achieve common, global metrics with the use of 
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clear, simple language which could be adapted to various levels of 
reporting.  
 Transparency and availability of data for all with no charges applied for its 
use. 
 Data sharing of best practice and lessons learnt from shipping accidents 
 Work with well-known shipping registries to understand the move East that 
occurs with older vessels. Review the options to keep older vessels in well-
known registries so that they can be better maintained particularly at this 
crucial stage in their life cycle.  
 Support the IMO in its encouragement of greater cooperation between 
MOU’s particularly in the areas highlighted as hotspots of sub-standard 
shipping.  
 Consider research of the human elements associated to shipping accidents 
in relation to the work in this report. 
 
 
 
 
5.0 Conclusions  
 
Shipping is a highly complex, global industry that provides trade networks across 
the world contributing to economic progress. As shipping delivers 90% of all world 
trade (IMO, 2011), it follows that this is an industry in growth, and one that is 
inherently complex. As the report identifies, these issues also apply to all aspects 
of shipping safety and many criteria have been highlighted in regard to shipping 
accidents. As technology advances and greater awareness of the attributing 
factors of shipping accidents are raised, it is essential to insist on better safety 
standards, both regarding the vessel itself, its crew and operators and on strict 
enforcement of procedures and regulations designed to minimise accidents. 
 
The recommendations set out in this report provide logical solutions in response to 
the research findings. In some cases they demonstrate the first steps to a solution 
and in others they highlight where resources could best be justified.  
 
Although it is logical to consider the global areas where the most incidents occur, 
the issues raised by this report should also be considered in highly sensitive areas 
where potential new trade routes may open up, such as the Artic and Western 
Canada, particularly in light of climate change predictions and the economic 
environment where new areas to obtain natural resources are continuously being 
sought and exploited. 
 
Despite decreases in shipping accidents over the last 15 years relative to the 
increase in the worlds’ fleet, poor flag State performance still has a consistent 
impact. Black lists kept by the ITF, the ICS and some of the MOUs can influence 
insurers and class societies against the worst offenders, but these lists themselves 
are not always looking at the bigger picture. In regard to the number of ships 
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registered to a flag, those with a high percentage of cumulative losses should be 
targeted to clean up their act. Ultimately this will be of benefit to the offending flag 
State itself, both in economic terms and to their reputation, and to the shipping 
industry in general. 
 
As highlighted in the report, whilst not a compulsory role, port States can make a 
major contribution to vessel safety standards. As such the onus is on them to help 
enforce high shipping standards and not turn a blind eye to sub-standards. 
However economics can make it difficult for some port States to make the right 
decisions in this regard and the reality maybe counter-productive to shipping 
safety, particularly in some small island States.   
 
Therefore the findings demonstrate that shipping accidents, whilst still related to 
poor flag State performance, cannot be reviewed in isolation. Consideration must 
be given in relation to other significant contributing factors identified in the report 
and the recommendations made on the strength of them. 
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Appendix A 
MOU member countries 
MOU/ Agreement Member countries include: 
Acuerdo de Viña del Mar 
Agreement. (The Latin 
American Agreement on 
Port State Control of 
Vessels) 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela 
Abuja MOU (West and 
Central Africa MoU) 
Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, 
Cote d’ Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Equatorial 
Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, São Tomé 
and Príncipe, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Guinea Bissau, The Gambia, and Togo 
Black Sea MOU Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Turkey and Ukraine 
Caribbean MOU Antigua & Barbuda, Belize, Barbados, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, the Netherlands 
Antilles, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago 
Indian Ocean MOU Australia, Bangladesh, Djibouti, Eritrea, France(La 
Reunion Island), India, Iran, Kenya, Maldives, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Tanzania and Yemen. 
Mediterranean MOU Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Malta, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. 
Paris MOU NIR2 Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland,  Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Netherlands,  Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
Riyadh MoU Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
UAEv 
Tokyo MOU Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong 
Kong(China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, The Philippines, The Russian Federation, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu and Vietnam. 
                                                 
2
 The Paris MoU New Inspection Regime is a recently-implemented system (effective from 1 
January 2011) used to evaluate a vessel's risk profile, and thereby determine the frequency of 
inspections, (Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region", 
as amended 20 November 2008. Available from: www.tokyo-mou.org). 
. 
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Appendix B: The Paris MOU Black, Grey and White List 
Valid 1st July 2011  
Black, 
Grey and 
White lists 
Flag  
Inspections 
2008-2010  
Detentions  
2008-2010  
Black to Grey Limit  Grey to white limit  Excess 
factor  
Black Black List 2008 - 2010 2008-2010  
Korea, 
Democratic 
People's Rep.  
45  17 6 Very High Risk  
High Risk 
7.31  
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya  
47  14  7  5.09  
Togo  150  37  16  5.02  
Sierra Leone  570  114  50  4.44  
Montenegro  34  10  5  4.43  
Albania  222  44  22  High risk  3.86  
Moldova, 
Republic of  
461  77 42 3.31  
Cambodia  863  135  73  3.22  
St Kitts and 
Nevis  
488  76  44  2.99  
Comoros  644  98  56  Medium Risk to High 
Risk  
2.99  
Georgia  776  106 67 2.57  
Bolivia  40  8  6  2.24  
Lebanon  72  12  9  2.04  
Syrian Arab 
Republic  
246  33  24  2.02  
Tanzania United 
Rep.  
65  10  8  Medium risk  1.62  
Ukraine  471  50 43 1.47  
St Vincent and 
the Grenadines  
1,957  168  156  1.19  
Azerbaijan  69  9  9  1.07 
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Valid 1st July 2011 
Flag  
Inspections 
2008-2010  
Detentions  
2008-2010  
Black to Grey Limit  Grey to White Limit  Excess 
Factor  
Grey list 2008-2010  
Egypt  112  12 13 3 0.92  
Cook Islands  150  15 16 5 0.90  
Viet Nam  37  5 6 0 0.89  
Dominica  167  16 18 6 0.86  
Algeria  98  10 12 2 0.84  
Slovakia  234  21 23 9 0.83  
Honduras  65  7 8 1 0.82  
Tunisia  57  6 8 0 0.77  
Jamaica  48  5 7 0 0.74  
Mongolia  43  4 6 0 0.65  
Tuvalu  36  3 6 0 0.58  
Morocco  153  11 16 5 0.53  
Saudi Arabia  62  3 8 1 0.32  
Bulgaria  230  13 23 9 0.27  
Belize  660  40 57 35 0.23  
Curacao  599  35 53 31 0.18  
Malaysia  74  2 9 1 0.11  
Switzerland  94  3 11 2 0.11  
Faroe Islands  157  6 17 5 0.07  
Vanuatu  177  7 18 6 0.06  
Latvia  144  5 16 5 0.04  
Iran, Islamic 
Republic of  
146  5 16 5 0.03  
Thailand  128  4 14 4 0.03  
United States of 
America  
128  4 14 4 0.03  
 
Valid 1st July 2011 
Flag  
Inspections 
2008-2010  
Detentions  
2008-2010  
Black to Grey Limit  Grey to White Limit  Excess 
Factor  
White list 2008-2010  
Kazakhstan  30  0 5 0  0.00 
Qatar  30  0 5 0  0.00 
Philippines  231  8 23 9  -0.24 
Panama  8,385  476 626 548  -0.30 
Korea, Republic 
of  
201  6 21 8  -0.35 
India  138  3 15 4  -0.41 
Japan  89  1 11 2  -0.44 
Turkey  2,294  108 181 140  -0.50 
Lithuania  227  6 23 9  -0.57 
Spain  278  8 27 12  -0.59 
Russian 
Federation  
1,965  80 157 118  -0.70 
Barbados  527  15 47 27  -0.87 
Cayman Islands, 
UK  
286  6 28 12  -0.93 
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Antigua and 
Barbuda  
5,235  195 397 336  -0.94 
Luxembourg  196  3 20 7  -0.96 
Malta  5,569  200 422 358  -0.99 
Poland  202  3 21 8  -1.00 
Portugal  542  13 48 28  -1.05 
Croatia  178  2 19 6  -1.10 
Liberia  4,461  132 341 284  -1.20 
Cyprus  2,694  76 211 166  -1.20 
Estonia  104  0 12 2  -1.25 
Gibraltar, UK  1,301  29 107 75  -1.33 
Belgium  231  2 23 9  -1.41 
Norway  2,323  51 183 142  -1.42 
Marshall Islands  2,260  49 179 138  -1.42 
Ireland  182  1 19 7  -1.43 
Bahamas  3,628  75 280 228  -1.51 
Singapore  1,375  24 112 80  -1.52 
Hong Kong, 
China  
1,422  22 116 83  -1.61 
Greece  1,475  22 120 87  -1.63 
Italy  1,487  22 121 87  -1.64 
Man, Isle of, UK  883  11 75 49  -1.65 
China  250  1 25 10  -1.68 
Finland  624  6 55 33  -1.71 
Denmark  1,385  17 113 81  -1.73 
France  355  2 33 16  -1.73 
Netherlands  3,860  54 297 244  -1.75 
United Kingdom  2,007  25 160 121  -1.76 
Sweden  984  9 83 55  -1.80 
Germany  1,388  14 113 81  -1.81 
Bermuda, UK  270  0 26 12  -1.91 
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Appendix C: ICS Flag State Performance List 
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